



# 習近平一色の党大会 権威ないまま権力を目的化

こくぶん りようせい  
国分 良成  
(前防衛大学校長)

中国共産党第20回党大会が終わった。今回の党大会を見ていて、むなしさばかりが心に残った。党の幹部たちに表情がないのだ。まるでロボットのように、人間性を感じない。習近平一色に染まった大会。ジョージ・オーウェルの小説「1984」に描かれた機械仕掛けの未来の独裁体制と二重写しになった。そこに登場する独裁者「ビッグ・ブラザー」は今日の習近平総書記の姿に重なるようだ。

## 胡氏が「抵抗」示す

しかし、党大会の最後の瞬間によりやく人間ドラマがあった。胡錦濤前総書記ⅡⅠⅠの不自然だが人間的な動きだ。退席させられたように見えるが、実際に何が起こったのかはわからない。ただ、その動きは明らかに胡氏の「抵抗」を示していた。習氏に何か一言つぶやいた後、弟子の李克強首相の肩に触れた。それは過去10年間、閑職に耐え抜いた李氏へのねぎらいだったのだろう。



中国共産党大会で、退席を求められた際、李克強首相（手前右から2人目）の肩に手をかける胡錦濤前総書記（中央で腕をつかまれている男性）。手前右端は習近平総書記＝北京で2022年10月22日、AP

胡氏の「抵抗」はどこからきたのか。振り返れば、胡錦濤政権は権力的に弱体であったが、共産党改革を進めようとする姿勢が見られた。政治腐敗が蔓延するなかで「能力建設」や「党内民主」を打ち出し、2006年には「党

政領導幹部職務任期暫行規定」を発出した。ここには高級幹部の党と国家のすべての役職の任期が1期5年で2期までと規定されている。

習氏は18年に憲法を改正して来春再任予定の国家主席の任期規定を撤廃したが、一方でこの党内規定が変更されたとは聞いていない。真面目な性格の胡氏の「抵抗」は、党内手続きの不備を訴えたのではないか。これが一つの推測だ。

中国政治の最大の弱みは、後継者を決めるルールが存在しないことだ。それゆえに後継決定をめぐって必ず権力闘争が起きる。それを嫌った当時の最高実力者、鄧小平氏は江沢民氏と胡氏の2人を後継に据えた。習氏の後継決定は江沢民派と胡錦濤派の妥協によって成り立った。

一般に言われる「68歳定年」もよくわからない。江氏は政敵の喬石氏を落とすために70歳定年とした。その後、引退にあたって、元氣な李瑞環氏と一緒に落とすために68歳定年を内部決定したという。真偽のほどは定かでないが、いずれにせよ、ルールが明確ゆえの中国特有の恣意的な話だ。

### イエスマンばかり

今回の党大会を一言で表現すれば、「習近平の習近平による習近平のための党大会」であった。自画自賛と個人崇拜に走る孤独な指導者に映る。

最後に選ばれた7人の政治局常務委員のうち、李強、趙樂際、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希の5氏はいずれも習氏のかつての部下か、お眼鏡にかなった人物で、まさにイエスマン常務委員会だ。第4位の王滬寧氏は江沢民、胡錦濤、習近平の3代に比べ、中国共産党の主義主張を守り続ける理論家である。彼はかつて中国一の若手政治学者として名をはせ、日本にも何度となく学術交流で来日したことがある。

党大会初日の習氏の政治報告は、過去10年間、彼がいかに大きな業績をあげたかに終始している。つまり、習氏が引き続き権力の座に居座ることの正当性を釈明しているのだ。

この10年間、経済成長は鈍化し、コロナは未解決、「一帶一路」は低迷、対米・対日をはじめ外交は摩擦だらけである。とはいえ確かに成果もあった。

反腐闘争ⅡⅡⅡがそれである。彼が総書記に就任した12年、中国共産党はほとんど世界最大の腐敗政党であった。彼は江沢民派を政治腐敗の元凶として10年かけてその壊滅に追い込み、他派閥への見せしめとした。要するに、反腐闘争は権力闘争であった。

政治報告は新たに「中国式現代化」という言葉を創り出した。「中国式現代化」とは「中国共産党の指導する社会主義現代化」である。中国の「国情」に根差したもので、具体的には「人口規模」や「共同富裕」「物質文明と精神

文明のバランス」「人と自然の調和的共生」「平和的發展」などを意味する。結局、人口規模が大きい「国情」に鑑みて共産党がすべてを支配するということにすぎず、何らそこに目新しさはない。

### 喪失した価値観

中国で深刻な問題の一つが価値観の喪失だ。習氏は「マルクス主義」をいやというほど強調する。だが、過去の中国はそこにしがみつき続けて行き詰まり、鄧氏の決断により大胆な改革開放を掲げ市場化を導入したのではなかったのか。

確かに共産党が介入する市場経済は政治腐敗を蔓延させた。とすれば、共産党の市場介入を避け、健全で開放的な市場化を実現して成長を遂げるのが上策と思えるが、それができない。共産党の指導力と既得権益を失う可能性が高いからだ。そこで持ち出したのは、信じている人は少ないが、誰も否定できないマルクス主義である。成長をけん引した民営企業を締め付け、成長力の弱い国有企業を優遇して、中国経済は大丈夫なのか。

また、世界が最も注目したのは、台湾問題に対する「武力使用」の可能性についての言及だ。従来は「非平和的形式」という表現であったが、今回はより本気度を示した形だ。もう一つ「外部勢力」への批判も入った。言うまでも



国分良成（こくぶん・りょうせい）氏

慶応大大学院修了、法学博士。慶応大で東アジア研究所長、法学部長などを歴任。2012年から21年まで防衛大学校長。現代中国論、東アジア政治。1997年アジア・太平洋賞特別賞、04年サントリー学芸賞、17年榎山純三賞。日本防衛学会会長、日本国際政治学会元理事長。

なく、これは米国や日本を指している。従来、台湾問題はすなわち中台関係であったが、今や米中関係の主要テーマに拡大している。米国は台湾侵攻の可能性を真剣に心配しており、日本も人ごとではない。

中国を見てみると、政治の本質は権力（パワー）だとつくづく思う。「強国」願望がそこかしこにじみ出る。しかし「権力」は「権威」を備えて初めて真の「権力」となる。

第一線から引いた毛沢東は権力奪回のために文化大革命を発動し、学生を使って権力装置を破壊して社会を混乱に陥れ、自身の権威も傷つけた。鄧氏は最高権力にもかかわらずに権威を高めたが、天安門事件によりこれを傷つけた。習氏は権力も権威も弱体

だったので10年間で権力を掌握したが、権威は不十分だ。だから個人崇拜に走る。

習近平体制の最大の問題は権力を私物化・目的化し、それによって何を指すのかが見えないことである。中国の政治体制はますます隘路（あひろ）に入り込みつつあるように見える。

■ことは

◇1 胡錦濤氏の退席劇

10月22日の党大会の閉幕式で、習氏の左側に座っていた胡氏が途中退席した。胡氏は近寄る男性係員らに嫌がるような仕草を見せ、腕をつかまれて立ち去る際には習氏に何か話しかけていた。中国国営新華社通信は同日夜、英語版のツイッターアカウントで「会議中に体調が悪くなり、係員が健康を考えて隣の部屋で休ませた」とツイートした。

◇2 反腐敗闘争

2012年に党総書記となった習氏は「虎（大物幹部）もハエ（末端官僚）もたたく」をスローガンに、大々的に汚職摘発を展開してきた。中国共産党は大会期間中の記者会見で、習指導部の約10年間に汚職などの不正で計464万件を立件・調査し、副大臣級以上の幹部500人以上、局長級幹部2万5000人以上を処分したことをなどを明らかにした。

The anti-corruption campaign is one of them. When Xi became the party general secretary in 2012, the Communist Party of China was almost the world's largest corrupt political party. He spent a decade driving the Jiang Zemin faction to the brink of destruction as the source of political corruption, making it an example to other factions. In short, the anti-corruption struggle was a power struggle.

The political report contained a new term, "Chinese modernization." This refers to "socialist modernization pursued under the leadership of the Communist Party of China." It is rooted in "features that are unique to the Chinese context," and specifically refers to "a huge population," "common prosperity for all," "material and cultural-ethical advancement," "harmony between humanity and nature," and "peaceful development." In the end, it merely means that the communist party will control everything in view of the "Chinese context" of large population size, and there is nothing new there.

Mr. Xi also kept emphasizing the importance of "Marxism" for China, a country that faces the loss of values as one of its serious problems. But didn't China in the past cling to Marxism, and then, after reaching an impasse, Deng Xiaoping decided to introduce marketization under the banner of bold reforms and opening up?

It is true that a market economy in which the communist party intervenes has led to widespread political corruption. If so, the good policy would be to avoid the party's intervention in the market and achieve growth through sound and open marketization. They cannot do so because there is a strong possibility of losing the leadership and vested interests of the Communist Party. That is why Xi brought out Marxism, which few believe in, but no one can deny in China. But can the Chinese economy remain safe by clamping down on private enterprises that have driven growth and favoring state-owned enterprises with weak growth potential?

During the party congress, what caught the world's attention most was Xi's reference to the possible "use of force" over Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province that needs to be reunited with the mainland. In his opening speech to the congress, the Chinese leader said of Taiwan, "We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary."

Previously, the terms for the mode of reunification included a "non-peaceful method," but this time the terminology took on a heavy touch. Also included was another criticism of "external forces," which means the United States and Japan. Traditionally, the Taiwan issue meant Cross Strait(China-Taiwan) relations, but now it has expanded to become a major theme in U.S.-China relations. The United States is seriously concerned about the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and Japan is no mere bystander.

Looking at China, one is reminded that the essence of politics is power. The desire to be a "strong nation" oozes out everywhere. However, "power" becomes true power only when it is accompanied by "authority."

Modern China's founding father Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to regain power following his retreat from the country's top position due to the failure of his Great Leap Forward policy. In the revolution, Mao used students to destroy the apparatus of power, plunging society into chaos and undermining his own authority. Deng Xiaoping increased his authority without attaining supreme power, but damaged it with the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. Xi's power and authority were weak at the beginning, so he seized more over the years, but his authority remains inadequate. That is why he turns to personal worship.

The biggest problem with the Xi Jinping regime is that it makes grabbing for power an end in and of itself, and uses power for its own ends, but there is no indication of what it aims to achieve. China's political system increasingly seems to be entering an impasse.

(By Ryosei Kokubun, former president of the National Defense Academy of Japan)

Ryosei Kokubun received his PhD in law from Keio University. He served as the dean of the Faculty of Law and Politics and the director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at Keio, and was the president of the National Defense Academy of Japan from 2012 to 2021. Awards he won include the Asia Pacific Award's special prize in 1997, the Suntory Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities in 2004, and the Junzo Kashiwama prize in 2017. He is the president of the Japan Society for Defense Studies and a former president of the Japan Association of International Relations (2006-2008).

## Global Perspective: China falling into political impasse with leadership lacking clear aim

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which concluded on Oct. 22, left me feeling utterly empty. This came from watching the expressionless faces of party leaders, looking like nothing so much as robots with no sense of humanity. The gathering this time was all about Xi Jinping, the supreme leader of the party, and strongly resembled the technology-driven dictatorship depicted in George Orwell's novel "Nineteen Eighty-Four." The autocratic "Big Brother" in the novel seems to overlap with the figure of today's General Secretary Xi Jinping.

But there was some drama in the final moments of the congress. It was an awkward, but human, move by former General Secretary Hu Jintao. It appears that Mr. Hu was forced to leave his seat, but we do not know exactly what happened. However, the move clearly indicated Hu's "resistance." After mumbling a few words to Mr. Xi, the elder man touched his protege, Premier Li Keqiang, on the shoulder. It was probably a gesture of appreciation for Li, who has endured in the nominal post for the past 10 years.

Why did Hu "resist"? The Hu Jintao administration that preceded Xi's was weak in terms of power, but it appeared interested in reforming the Communist Party. In the face of widespread political corruption, the Hu administration emphasized the "construction of administrative capacity" and "internal party democracy," and in 2006 issued the provisional regulations on party leaders' terms in office. These stipulate that high-level cadres may serve no more than two terms of five years each in all party and state posts.

In 2018, Mr. Xi amended the Chinese constitution to eliminate the term limitation for the president, who is scheduled to be reappointed next spring. However, we have not heard that these provisional party regulations have been changed. The "resistance" of Mr. Hu, who has a serious character, may have been a way to complain about the potential discrepancy between the constitution and the party regulations. This is one possibility.

In China, there is always a power struggle over succession due to its political system's greatest weakness – the absence of rules for determining who will lead next. Deng Xiaoping, China's supreme leader until 1989, did not like this and chose Jiang Zemin and Hu as his successors. The Jiang and Hu factions compromised in choosing their heir and so Xi emerged as the current leader.

Another factor in the murkiness of China's political succession is the generally accepted practice of retirement at age 68. According to people familiar with the matter, Mr. Jiang first set the age limit at 70 in a bid to bring down his political rival Qiao Shi, and then lowered the bar further upon his own retirement to block the ascent of the energetic Li Ruihuan, another party strongman. The truth is unclear, but in any case, it was an arbitrary decision peculiar to China due to its unclear rules.

In any case, this year's party congress was, in a nutshell, "of Xi Jinping, by Xi Jinping, for Xi Jinping." He appears to be a solitary leader who is driven by self-praise and personal worship.

Look at the seven Politburo Standing Committee members elected on the last day. Five of them, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Qi, are all former subordinates of Xi or people favored by him, making it a truly yes-man panel. The fourth-ranking member, Wang Huning, is a theorist who served under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping and continues to defend the principles of the Chinese Communist Party. He was once renowned as China's best young political scientist and has visited Japan on numerous occasions for academic exchanges about thirty years ago.

On the first day of the congress, Xi's political report was entirely devoted to how he has made great achievements over the past decade. In other words, it focused on providing justification for Xi's continued reign of power.

But during the past decade, economic growth has slowed, and the nation remains under the grip of the COVID-19 pandemic. The "One Belt, One Road" initiative of overseas infrastructure investment has faltered, and diplomacy, including with the U.S. and Japan, has been riddled with friction. Nevertheless, there have certainly been some achievements.