



米中対立と「台湾有事」 習氏、鄧小平に学べるか

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中国の最高指導者だった鄧小平の「遺言」なるものがかつてネット上に流布した。天安門事件とソ連の崩壊を経て、生き残りをかけて大胆な市場経済化にかじを切った南巡講話直後の1992年6月、秘書の王瑞林に語ったといわれる文書だ。

中国の最大の問題を民主と法制とし、米国憲法に学ぼう語った。また、台湾問題での武力行使を禁じ、その解決に連邦制の可能性すら示唆し、歴史上米国が中国にとつて最も信頼できる国だと語っている。この文書は偽物の可能

性が高いのだが、「韜光養晦」とうこうようかい ⅡⅠⅡを訴え続けた鄧小平らしい内容だ。

冒頭から確証のない話で恐縮だが、その「遺言」とまったく逆の道を歩む習近平国家主席が、鄧小平について語るのを避けているのは確かだ。習主席は「改革」は語るが、「開放」かいほう「市場経済」には、ほとんど触れず「マルクス主義」を多用する。習主席の発言のなかに鄧小平はあまり登場しない。習主席の父・習仲勲は、学生の民主化運動に好意的な姿勢を取って失脚した胡耀邦元総書記を擁護して鄧小平



改革・開放路線の中心地となった中国沿海部・深圳の中心部に設置されている鄧小平氏の肖像画。「党の基本方針は100年揺るがず堅持する」と書かれている＝2023年3月、米村耕一撮影

との関係が崩れ、閑職に追いやられたといわれる。

習主席が米国嫌いだという確固たる証拠はない。また、就任以来、日本の歴史問題にもほとんど触れず、娘もかつて米国留学前に日本に一定期間滞在していたともいわれる。にもかかわらず、米中関係は抜き差しならないまでに緊張し、日中関係も不安定なままだ。

関与政策裏切られ

鄧小平に言わせるまでもなく、習近平外交の最大の失敗は米国との対立をこれほどに拡大してしまったことだ。私は現在米スタンフォード大学に滞在しているが、米国で流れる報道は中国たたきで満ちあふれており、対話ルートもか細い。

なぜ米国がこれほどまでに中国嫌いになったのか。90年代のクリントン政権時代から始まった対中エンゲージメント（関与）政策の反動が、その背景にある。イラクにせよアフガニスタンにせよ、米国はいつか自国のような社会になるとの確信のもとに軍事介入した。

ましてや改革・開放によって市場化を進める中国には民主化も夢ではないと米国は期待していた。米国の対中政策の基本ラインはオバマ政権まで変わらず、関与政策はトランプ政権になってようやく終わった。中国への過剰な期待は「裏切られた」という思いを一層強めた。

日本の中国観は米国よりもっとクールだ。日本も関与政策を支持したが、中国を外から体制転換させるのはとても無理とみて、中国を国際システムに誘導することで少しでも国際化を促そうとした。しかし天安門事件などでの対中配慮にもかかわらず、歴史認識や尖閣諸島問題で苦しめられ、日本の対中期待感^{（注）}は急激に薄れていった。

問題の本質は中台

米国の対中強硬姿勢は当分変わりそうにない。バイデン政権は対話を進めたいのが本音のようだが、議会とメディアはそれぞれころではない。その隙を縫うように、中国は欧州、中東、東南アジア、南米などに秋波を送っている。中国のお家芸の主要矛盾（米国）に対する副次矛盾（中間派）の抱き込みだ。

台湾問題の核心は米中対立だ。しかし本来、台湾問題の本質は中台関係にある。台湾が独立へ向かうのか、それとも大陸に接近するのか、分岐点はそこだ。台湾の世論調査を見れば、台湾人の対米信頼感^{（注）}は対日に比べて従来相当に低かった。なぜなら米国は対中関与で、台湾を一貫して重視してこなかったからである。大陸との対話を促したクリントン政権に対して当時の李登輝総統はやや困惑気味であったと個人的に記憶している。

本当に有事あるか

最大の関心は本当に有事がありうるかどうかだ。台湾の蔡英文政権はこれまでのところ強硬な独立志向を示していない。最近、蔡総統は米国に立ち寄ったが、訪台を棚上げしたマツカーシー下院議長とカリフォルニアで会っただけだ。この間、大陸を訪問した中国寄りの馬英九前総統は北京に行けず、共産党指導者との会見もなかった。米中の自制が目立った。

台湾問題のカギは習主席の腹積もり一つである。結論から言えば、台湾への武力侵攻の可能性は放棄しないであろうし、独立に対する威嚇は続けつつ、世論操作も含めて台湾内部の大陸傾斜を促す平和攻勢を展開する可能性も高い。選択肢はその間でいろいろ考えられる。最終判断は習主席が台湾あるいは米国が打ち出す今後の政策をどう見るか、一線を越えたと見るかどうかだ。その一線の基準も恣意的で、すべて習主席の判断次第だ。

ただし、思惑のほかに能力の問題もある。編成途上でも比較的小規模な中国軍の海兵隊で台湾のどこにどうやって上陸するのか。台湾海峡は百数十キロ以上離れており、到達前にやられてしまう。サイバーとミサイル攻撃だけで台湾を制圧できるのか。中国は北朝鮮の金日成とソ連のスターリンの要請に応じて朝鮮戦争に参戦したので台湾を



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「解放」できなかつたと言うが、最近の研究は当時の中国に海峡を渡る能力もなかつたし、金門島¹2¹奪回すら無理だつたと指摘する。

たとえ中国が台湾を武力統一したとしても、その先の苦労は見えている。すでにチベットやウイグルだけでなく、経済的な貧困層や利益を享受できなくなつた中間層など、大陸ではあちこちで不満分子がくすぶっている。大陸嫌いの人間であふれた台湾を統治するのに、果たしてどれほどの力が必要だろう。

かつて毛沢東は福建省アモイ市の目の前にある台湾との激戦地・金門島を奪取せず、台湾領有のままにする決定を行った。それは目の前に敵を残すことで内戦が終わらないと判断したからだ。究

極目標を完遂すると、目的を喪失する。「台湾統一」は目標のままが一番安定する。

鄧小平は83年6月、台湾の1国2制度に関して「台湾は自己の軍隊を持つことができ、大陸への脅威となつてはならないだけです。大陸は台湾に人を派遣せず、軍隊ばかりか、行政人員も派遣しないことにします」と公に語っている。革命の先達が台湾問題に関して知恵をもって柔軟に思考したように、習主席も中国の長い歴史とその教訓を十分にくんでいると信じたい。

■ことば

◇1 韜光養晦

「韜」は刀を入れる袋の意味で、「晦」はみそかで月が隠れる時のことを指す。刀の光を遮るように才能を隠して、隠ししながら時機を待つことを指す。1989年に天安門事件で国際社会から経済制裁を受け、東欧の社会主義諸国が崩壊する中、当時の最高指導者だつた鄧小平が、これを外交・安全保障の方針としたといわれる。

◇2 金門島

金門島がある台湾の金門県は12の島からなる。最も近い島は中国・福建省アモイ市から約2^キしか離れていない。一方、台湾本島からは約200^キ。1949年の中台分裂で国民党政権が台湾に逃れた後、台湾側が島を実効支配している。中国は54、55年と58年に、金門島を大々的に砲撃。それぞれ、第1次、第2次台湾海峡危機と呼ばれる。

This U.S.-China conflict is now at the core of the Taiwan issue. However, the essence of the Taiwan issue traditionally lies in the Sino-Taiwanese relationship. Whether Taiwan will move toward independence or move closer to the mainland is the point of divergence. Taiwanese public opinion polls show that Taiwanese people's trust in the U.S. has traditionally been considerably lower than their trust in Japan. This is because the U.S. has not consistently emphasized Taiwan and pursued engagement with China. I personally remember that President Lee Teng-hui was somewhat perplexed by the Clinton administration's urging of dialogue with the mainland.

The biggest concern is whether a contingency is really possible. Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen administration has so far shown no hardline orientation for independence. President Tsai recently made a stopover in the U.S., but only met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, who had shelved his plan to visit Taiwan. During this period, former President Ma Ying-jeou, a China-leaning president who visited the mainland, failed to make it to Beijing and did not meet with Communist Party leaders. Restraint between the U.S. and China was conspicuous.

The single decisive factor in the Taiwan issue is President Xi's resolve. In summary, he will not abandon the possibility of an armed invasion of Taiwan, and continue to threaten against independence. However, there is also a strong possibility of a peaceful offensive to encourage a mainland tilt within Taiwan, including through manipulation of public opinion. There are many possible options in between. The final decision will depend on how President Xi views the future policies of Taiwan and the United States, and whether he sees them as having crossed a line. The criteria for that line are also arbitrary and entirely up to Xi's judgment.

In addition to intentions, there is also the issue of competence. How and where in Taiwan would the relatively small Chinese marine forces, which are still in the process of being formed, land? The Taiwan Strait is more than a hundred kilometers wide, and they would be defeated before they could reach the island. How could they control Taiwan with cyber and missile attacks alone? China says that it could not "liberate" Taiwan because it entered the Korean War at the request of North Korea's Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Union's Stalin. But recent studies suggest that China did not have the ability to cross the strait at that time, and even the capture of Kinmen Island, which is only 10 kilometers from the mainland, was impossible.

Even if China were to unify Taiwan by force, we can see the hardships ahead. There are already dissatisfied elements smoldering all over the mainland, not only in Tibet and the Uyghur region, but also in the economically poor and the middle class that no longer enjoys benefits. How much power will it really take to govern a Taiwan full of people who hate the mainland?

In the past, Mao Zedong made the decision not to seize Kinmen Island, the site of a fierce battle with Taiwan, located right in front of Xiamen City in Fujian Province, but to leave it under Taiwanese possession. This was because he decided that leaving the enemy in front of him would not end the civil war. Once the ultimate goal is accomplished, the objective is lost. "Taiwan reunification" would be most stable if it remained a goal.

In June 1983, Deng Xiaoping said regarding the one country, two systems arrangement with Taiwan, "Taiwan can have its own army, only it must not become a threat to the mainland. The mainland will station neither troops nor administrative personnel in Taiwan," he said publicly.

Just as those revolutionary predecessors were wise and flexible in their thinking on the Taiwan issue, I hope that President Xi fully heeds the lessons of China's long history.

(By Ryosei Kokubun, Professor Emeritus, Keio University)

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Global Perspective: History offers lessons on Taiwan for Chinese president

A so-called “will” of Deng Xiaoping, China’s former supreme leader, was once circulated on the internet. It is a document said to have been dictated by Deng to his secretary, Wang Ruilin, in June 1992, shortly after his tour of southern China. During the tour, he made a series of speeches that would decisively steer China toward a market economy for the communist country’s survival following the Tiananmen Square incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the document, Deng was quoted as saying that China’s biggest problems were democracy and the legal system, and the Chinese people should learn from the U.S. constitution. He also forbade the use of force over the Taiwan issue, even suggesting the possibility of a federal system to resolve the conundrum, and said that the U.S. is the most reliable country for China in history. Although the document is most likely fake, it is typical of Deng Xiaoping, who has always called for “taoguang yanghui,” or hiding one’s talents and biding one’s time for the right opportunity.

Excuse me for beginning this essay with a tale lacking a solid foundation, but it is clear that Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has taken the exact opposite path from this “will,” has avoided talking about Deng Xiaoping. President Xi talks about “reform,” but he rarely mentions “opening up” and “market economy” -- main themes in Deng’s southern tour speeches -- and he uses “Marxism” a lot. Deng Xiaoping does not appear much in President Xi’s remarks. Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, is said to have been forced into a sinecure post after his relationship with Deng deteriorated. The elder Xi had defended Hu Yaobang, the former general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party who was ousted for taking a favorable stance toward the student democracy movement.

There is no firm evidence that President Xi dislikes the United States. Since assuming the current post, he rarely touched on historical issues with Japan, and his daughter is said to have stayed in Japan for some time before moving to the U.S. to study. Nevertheless, the U.S.-China relationship is now very tense with no wiggle room, and Japan-China ties remain unstable.

One does not need Deng’s words to see that the biggest failure of the Xi Jinping diplomacy was allowing China’s confrontation with the U.S. to escalate to the current high. I am now staying at Stanford University, and what I see in the U.S. press is mostly China bashing reports. Bilateral channels for dialogue have become very thin.

Why has the U.S. come to hate China so much? What lies behind this sentiment is the backlash from the engagement policy launched by the Clinton administration in the second half of the 1990s. Whether it was Iraq or Afghanistan, the U.S. intervened militarily in the belief that one day the societies of those countries would become like that of the U.S. The U.S. also hoped that it was not a wild dream to expect China, which was moving toward marketization through reform and opening up, to become a democracy. The basic line of U.S. policy toward China remained unchanged until the Obama administration, and the policy of engagement finally ended with the Trump administration. Excessive expectations for China have further intensified the feeling of “betrayal.”

Japan’s view of China is even cooler than that of the U.S. Japan also supported the engagement policy, but it saw it as very difficult to change China’s system from the outside and tried to promote internationalization as much as possible by guiding China closer to the international system. However, despite its consideration for China during the Tiananmen Square incident and other events, Japan’s expectations toward China faded sharply as it was tormented by differences over historical issues and territorial rivalry over the Senkaku Islands.

The U.S. hardline stance toward China is unlikely to change for the time being. The Biden administration apparently wants to promote dialogue, but Congress and the media are having none of it. In the meantime, China is trying to grab the attention of Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South America. It is China’s house specialty of tackling non-principal contradictions (neutral countries) in a bid to influence the principle contradiction (the U.S.).